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REORIENTING PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE AROUND
HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM RATHER THAN LIBERTY AFTER
WALDEN v. FIORE
by
*
Allan Erbsen
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing personal jurisdiction has
vacillated between different rationales for limiting judicial authority.
Some decisions emphasize liberty, some invoke federalism, and some rely
on both. This Article uses the Court’s 2014 decision in Walden v. Fiore
to show that recent emphasis on gilded rhetoric about liberty blurs the
distinction between venue and jurisdiction, misconstrues the relevant
private interests, and fails to consider the allocation of authority among
coequal states in a federal system.
Walden held that adjudication of a civil suit in a Nevada federal court
rather than in a Georgia federal court would infringe the defendant’s
“liberty.” However, this Article explains that if Congress had authorized
nationwide service of process, the supposedly abusive assertion of
personal jurisdiction that the Court unanimously found
unconstitutional would have been justified.
Congress’s power to confer personal jurisdiction that would otherwise be
unconstitutional requires rethinking how the Constitution limits states’
adjudicative authority. The prospect of nationwide jurisdiction
highlights a critical distinction between states as physical places and
states as government entities. Jurisdiction might be appropriate in a state
even if a defendant cannot be compelled to appear by the state. This
in/by distinction reveals that modern personal jurisdiction doctrine
conflates two distinct questions: (1) where may litigation occur, and (2)
which governments may authorize litigation. Disentangling the “where”
and “which governments” questions has several implications.
First, constitutional limits on venue may operate separately from limits
on personal jurisdiction. Venue doctrine should assess whether litigation
in a particular physical location is appropriate while personal
jurisdiction doctrine should consider whether a particular government
can compel the defendant to appear. Second, individual liberty is not a
helpful animating principle for determining which governments should
be able to authorize jurisdiction. My argument does not rely on formal
labels, but the word “immunity” may be more helpful than liberty for
describing the dynamics of personal jurisdiction when defendants are
domiciled outside the forum. Essentially, defendants have a limited
*
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immunity from suit that the forum can abrogate, depending on the
defendant’s actions, government interests, and competing private
interests. In contrast, a “liberty” interest that Congress can override
merely by deciding to authorize nationwide service seems hollow. Third,
principles of horizontal federalism—which govern relationships between
states in a federal system—can help courts allocate jurisdictional power
among potential fora. Courts might profitably analogize issues that arise
when considering personal jurisdiction to issues that arise when
analyzing choice of law, enforcement of judgments, extraterritorial
legislation, and dormant federal preemption of state authority.
I.
II.

Walden’s Facts and Holding ...................................................... 772
If Congress Had Authorized Nationwide Service of
Process, the Defendant in Walden Would Have Been
Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in Nevada ........................ 774
Congress’s Power to Authorize Personal Jurisdiction
Even When the Defendant Lacks Contacts with the
Forum State Undermines Several Pillars of Modern
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine .............................................. 779
A. Disentangling the Physical and Legal Dimensions of States and
Distinguishing Constitutional Limits on Venue from
Constitutional Limits on Jurisdiction.......................................... 780
B. Decoupling Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine from Concerns About
Liberty ...................................................................................... 781
C. Reframing Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in Terms of Horizontal
Federalism ................................................................................. 787
Conclusion .................................................................................. 790

III.

IV.

Imagine a simple hypothetical case in which a state court lacks
personal jurisdiction. A resident of Florida driving through his small
hometown while intoxicated struck a vacationing Alaska resident, causing
moderate injuries. The driver had never set foot outside Florida and did
not anticipate that he would encounter non-Floridians along his route.
The victim recuperated from her injuries in Florida, returned to Alaska
at the end of her vacation, and filed a civil action against the driver in an
Alaska state court. May the Alaska court exercise personal jurisdiction
under current doctrine? Of course not. Modern personal jurisdiction
doctrine requires “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the
1
forum. The driver had no contacts with Alaska and therefore was beyond
2
its reach.
1

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In Rush, a one-car accident in Indiana
injured two Indiana residents. The passenger then moved to Minnesota, where she
filed a civil action against the driver. Among several reasons for rejecting personal
jurisdiction, the Court held that “the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum” were
irrelevant when the defendant had “no contacts with the forum.” Id. at 332 (emphasis
in original).
2
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Now suppose that the Supreme Court decides to revisit personal
jurisdiction doctrine from first principles. Instead of relying on
precedent, our hypothetical Florida resident would need to articulate a
theory of why he is immune from suit in Alaska.
Objections to jurisdiction might take three forms. First, the
defendant has no contacts with the forum, suggesting that he may have a
liberty interest in resisting the forum’s authority. Second, the forum is far
from the defendant’s home. Litigation in the distant forum might
therefore impose undue burdens on the defendant’s liberty. Finally,
coequal states in a federal system have competing interests in providing a
forum for civil litigation. Here, conduct, injuries, and convalescence
occurred in the same state, suggesting that the case belongs in that state
rather than in the state where the plaintiff resided. The first two
objections replicate modern doctrine by raising concerns about liberty.
But the third objection departs from the supposed focus of modern
3
doctrine by raising concerns about federalism.
If we revisit personal jurisdiction doctrine from first principles, we
must ask whether the first two objections should be more salient than the
third. Why should courts conceptualize jurisdictional limits in terms of
liberty rather than in terms of the allocation of regulatory power within a
federal system? The defendant’s interests would still matter in a legal
calculus centered on federalism, but the nature and weight of those
interests would differ if liberty were not the animating principle.
4
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Walden v. Fiore provides an
opportunity to revisit the role of federalism in personal jurisdiction
doctrine. In Walden, the Court unanimously held that adjudication of a
civil suit in a Nevada federal court rather than in a Georgia federal court
would infringe the defendant’s “liberty” because he lacked a “substantial
5
connection with the forum State.”
Congress could have avoided the result in Walden by authorizing
6
nationwide service of process. If Congress had authorized nationwide
service, the defendant’s contacts with the United States would have
permitted litigation in Nevada despite his lack of contacts with Nevada.
The supposedly abusive assertion of personal jurisdiction that a
unanimous Court found unconstitutional would have been justified.
The fact that Congress can confer personal jurisdiction that
otherwise would not survive constitutional scrutiny requires rethinking
how the Constitution limits states’ adjudicative authority. Congress’s
power highlights a critical distinction between states as physical places
and states as government entities. Jurisdiction might be appropriate in a
state even if a defendant cannot be compelled to appear by the state. This

3
4
5
6

See infra Part III(B).
134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
Id. at 1121–22, 1125 n.9.
See infra Part II.
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in/by distinction reveals that modern personal jurisdiction doctrine
conflates two distinct questions: (1) where may litigation occur, and (2)
which governments may authorize litigation. Disentangling these
questions has several implications. First, constitutional limits on venue
may operate separately from limits on personal jurisdiction. Second,
individual liberty is not a helpful animating principle for determining
which governments should be able to authorize jurisdiction. Third,
principles of horizontal federalism—which govern relationships between
states in a federal system—can help courts allocate jurisdictional
authority among potential fora.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the facts and
holding in Walden. Part II explains why jurisdiction would have been
appropriate in Nevada if Congress had authorized nationwide service of
process. Finally, Part III explores the implications of Congress’s power to
authorize jurisdiction that would otherwise have been unconstitutional. I
previously addressed some of these implications in a wider-ranging article
that predates Walden (as well as the Court’s important decision in J.
7 8
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro ). This Article builds on my prior work
and highlights the continued need to rethink personal jurisdiction
doctrine as it becomes progressively more unwieldy and undertheorized.
I. WALDEN’S FACTS AND HOLDING
9

According to their complaint, plaintiffs Gina Fiore and Keith
Gipson were professional gamblers who were travelling through an
10
airport in Atlanta, Georgia, en route to their residence in Nevada.
11
Defendant Michael Anthony Walden was a local Georgia police officer
working with a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force at
12
the airport.
Various interactions in Atlanta between the plaintiffs and the DEA
led the DEA to seize approximately $97,000 in cash from the plaintiffs’
13
clothing and baggage. Walden then submitted an affidavit of probable
cause justifying civil forfeiture of the seized currency by connecting the
14
money to drug trafficking. This affidavit was allegedly false because
Walden knew that the money was not related to drugs and was instead

7

131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1 (2010).
9
The Court assumed that the allegations in the complaint were true. See Walden,
134 S. Ct. at 1119 n.2. This Article makes the same assumption.
10
See id. at 1119.
11
The Court referred to the defendant as “Anthony Walden.” Id. at 1119. But he
signed his declaration as “Michael Anthony Walden.” Joint Appendix at 43, Walden,
134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574).
12
See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119.
13
See id.
14
See id.
8
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15

related to legal gambling. The United States Attorney’s Office in
Georgia eventually instructed the DEA to return the seized currency to
16
plaintiffs.
17
The plaintiffs filed a Bivens action against Walden in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada. They alleged that the false
affidavit violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment by delaying
18
return of their money.
Personal jurisdiction in Nevada was tenuous. Walden’s sole relevant
contacts with the forum were that he knew that the seized currency was
en route to Nevada, knew that some of it may have originated in Nevada,
and acted in a way that caused the plaintiffs to suffer emotional and
19
economic injuries in Nevada. In all other respects, Walden’s contacts
were with Georgia—where he lived, worked, seized the currency, and
wrote the affidavit.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that Walden was not subject
to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. Although he had contacts with
20
residents of Nevada, he did not have contact with “Nevada itself.” The
Court observed that “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient
connection to the forum” absent conduct by the defendant that
21
“connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden’s contacts
with Nevada were not “meaningful” because even though he “knew”
22
about them, he did not “create” them. Instead, the plaintiffs “chose” to
23
locate themselves in Nevada. Thus, the fact that Walden “never traveled
to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or
24
anyone to Nevada” precluded jurisdiction.

15

See id. at 1120.
See id.
17
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
18
The complaint arguably did not articulate the claim that animated plaintiffs’
appellate theory of personal jurisdiction. See Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 593 n.4
(9th Cir. 2012) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“One combs through the complaint in vain to
find any argument that the creation of a false probable cause affidavit is a separate
constitutional tort [from the wrongful seizure].”), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
19
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119, 1125–26. Walden also “may have known that
Plaintiffs lived in Nevada.” Fiore v. Walden, No. 2:07-CV-01674-ECR, 2008 WL
9833854, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2008), rev’d, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134
S. Ct. 1115.
20
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125. For a critique of Walden’s distinction between a state
and its residents, see Allan Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Local Effects of
Intentional Misconduct, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 385.
21
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125.
22
Id. at 1125–26.
23
Id. at 1125.
24
Id. at 1124.
16
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II. IF CONGRESS HAD AUTHORIZED NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF
PROCESS, THE DEFENDANT IN WALDEN WOULD HAVE BEEN
SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN NEVADA
Walden relies on precedent about personal jurisdiction that invokes
25
lofty ideals of “liberty,” “fair play,” and “substantial justice.” This styling
implies that the holding is a bulwark against extravagant assertions of
jurisdiction and that the facts of the case were fundamentally
incompatible with adjudication in Nevada. Yet the exact same facts would
have warranted jurisdiction in Nevada if Congress had changed the
applicable service of process rule.
Jurisdiction was not appropriate in Nevada because Congress has not
26
authorized nationwide service of process in Bivens actions. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k) governs “Territorial Limits” for service of process
27
in federal court. The default under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is that federal
28
courts borrow the long-arm statute of the state in which they sit. The
Supreme Court therefore analyzed personal jurisdiction over Walden as
29
if the case were filed in a Nevada state court. If Congress had authorized
nationwide service of process, then Rule 4(k)(1)(C) would have made
25

See id. at 1121–22.
Congress arguably did authorize nationwide service of process in Bivens
actions, but the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the statute. A venue statute
governing suits against federal officers allows plaintiffs to sue in their home states and
serve process “beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C), (e)(2) (2012). The Supreme Court observed
that § 1391(e)(2) authorizes “nationwide service of process.” Schlanger v. Seamans,
401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971). However, the Court held that § 1391(e) does not apply
to “personal damages actions,” including Bivens actions. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S.
527, 545 (1980). For an argument that Stafford misread § 1391(e), see Daniel
Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and
Stafford v. Briggs, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 713 (2015). Interestingly, even if
§ 1391(e) applied to Bivens actions, it might not have applied to the action against
Walden. The statute governs suits against an “officer or employee of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). Walden was a local police officer working on a state–
federal task force. The United States acknowledged that he was a “federal agent.”
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Walden, 134
S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574). Whether he was a federal “officer or employee” under
§ 1391(e) is unclear, although courts have treated local police officers as federal
officers under analogous circumstances. See United States v. Luna, 649 F.3d 91, 98
(1st Cir. 2011) (holding that local law enforcement officer working on a joint
federal–state task force was an “officer . . . of the United States” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 111); United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that local police officer deputized by the FBI was an “officer . . . of the United States”
under 18 U.S.C. § 1114).
27
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
28
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons . . . establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”).
29
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) and the Nevada
long-arm statute).
26
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30

the Nevada long-arm statute irrelevant. The federal district court would
no longer have needed to confine itself to the jurisdictional reach of
31
Nevada’s courts.
If a statute had authorized nationwide service, then a different
constitutional standard would have governed Walden’s objection to
personal jurisdiction. His contacts with the forum would still have
mattered, but the definition of the forum would have changed. The
32
United States would have been the relevant forum, rather than Nevada.
That expanded geographic focus makes all the difference: Walden’s
limited contacts with Nevada would cease to preclude jurisdiction and his
33
contacts with the United States as a whole would justify jurisdiction.
The constitutional inquiry for nationwide service cases in federal
courts is less developed than the parallel inquiry for ordinary cases in
34
state courts. However, jurisdiction over Walden in Nevada would have
been appropriate under either of two theories.
First, the Court has held that a state can exercise general jurisdiction
35
over its domiciliaries. A similar rule would presumably enable federal
courts to exercise general jurisdiction over United States domiciliaries
36
when Congress authorizes nationwide service. The Court has never
30

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (in effect establishing personal jurisdiction
“when authorized by a federal statute”).
31
For a more detailed analysis of personal jurisdiction when Congress authorizes
nationwide service, see Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases,
70 Tex. L. Rev. 1589 (1992); Erbsen, supra note 8, at 49–54; Howard M. Erichson,
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1117 (1989).
32
See, e.g., Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that when a statute authorizes nationwide service of process,
the “relevant forum” for constitutional purposes is “the United States”).
33
See infra notes 40–42.
34
Precedent is sparse for two reasons. First, only a few statutes authorize
nationwide service, creating relatively few opportunities for litigation about personal
jurisdiction. See Erichson, supra note 31, at 1123 n.30. Second, the constitutional
standard for personal jurisdiction in nationwide service cases imposes relatively few
limits on the forum’s authority, such that many defendants (especially if they reside
in the United States) would not bother challenging jurisdiction. See infra notes 40–42.
35
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853
(2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)
(“Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the
reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of
appropriate substituted service.”).
36
General jurisdiction in state court is not entirely analogous to general
jurisdiction in federal court because the United States is much larger than any state,
rendering federal jurisdiction more burdensome. However, litigation burdens are
best understood as implicating constitutional limits on venue rather than
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction. See infra Part III(A). Another distinction
between general jurisdiction in federal and state court might be the varying history
relevant to each. Thus, although personal service in the forum state is usually
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a natural person in state court, service outside
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expressly endorsed (or rejected) this rule, but three Justices concluded
that “there [are] no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the
37
exercise of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents.” A fourth
Justice later reached the same conclusion, observing that “[n]o due
process problem exists” when federal courts exercise personal
38
jurisdiction over “residents of the United States.”
Second, even if general jurisdiction based on domicile was not
available, a nationwide service statute would still have authorized
jurisdiction in Nevada under the minimum contacts test. The Supreme
Court has explicitly declined to decide whether federal statutes
authorizing nationwide service permit personal jurisdiction “based on an
aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a whole,
39
rather than on its contacts with the State in which the federal court sits.”
However, all the federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue
agree that when Congress authorizes nationwide service, the Constitution
requires minimum contacts with the United States rather than with the
forum state. In six circuits, minimum contacts with the United States are
40
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Four circuits add a requirement that
41
adjudication in the forum must be fair. Two other circuits fall into one
42
of these groups, but have not been clear about which.
the forum state but within the United States might not be sufficient in federal court
even when Congress authorizes nationwide service. See Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (linking jurisdiction based on presence
in the forum to “continuing traditions of our legal system”).
37
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 192 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
38
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Assessing
Congress’s authority to authorize nationwide service against foreign entities in
transnational litigation may raise additional issues that are not present when the
defendant is a United States resident. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763
(2014) (noting importance of “comity” and “international rapport” when analyzing
general jurisdiction in transnational litigation); cf. Donald Earl Childress III, General
Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 67 (2013),
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2013/09/Childress_Final.pdf
(considering how forum shopping in transnational litigation should affect traditional
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence).
39
Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987).
40
See Luallen v. Higgs, 277 F. App’x 402, 404–05 (5th Cir. 2008) (confirming
validity of previously challenged decision in Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien,
Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994)); SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100, 1106
n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001);
Bd. of Trs. v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Fed.
Fountain, Inc., 165 F.3d 600, 601–02 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Go-Video Inc. v. Akai
Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (9th Cir. 1989).
41
See SEC v. Montle, 65 F. App’x 749, 751–52 (2d Cir. 2003); Peay v. BellSouth
Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000); ESAB Grp., Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir. 1997); Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings
(Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945–48 (11th Cir. 1997).
42
See Sinclair v. Atty. Gen., 198 F. App’x 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2006) (confirming
continued uncertainty after Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370 n.2 (3d
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Jurisdiction over Walden in Nevada would have been appropriate
under the minimum contacts standard that applies to nationwide service
43
cases in federal courts. Walden had ample contacts with the United
States, where he resided, worked, acted, and caused injury. His lack of
contacts with Nevada would have been irrelevant.
Even in the circuits that consider whether personal jurisdiction in
44
nationwide service cases would be unfair, Walden would have lacked a
compelling fairness objection. Indeed, Walden’s counsel conceded at
oral argument that his client would have lacked a constitutional
objection to personal jurisdiction if Congress had authorized nationwide
45
service. That concession was appropriate. Walden did not need to locate
competent local counsel because he was represented in the District Court
46
by Department of Justice lawyers based in Nevada. He also probably
would not have had to travel to Nevada. His deposition could have been
47
taken in Georgia, his physical presence would have been unnecessary
48
for routine hearings, and the probability of the case going to trial was at
Cir. 2002)); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d
1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992).
43
For an argument that the current standard should be stricter, see Janet Cooper
Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev.
387, 439 (1992) (“Since International Shoe, we have viewed the constitutionality of
exercises of personal jurisdiction as a question of fundamental fairness that turns on
an individualized evaluation of the burdens and inconvenience to the defendant in
light of the relationship of the defendant and the litigation to the forum. These
concerns do not evaporate if a different flag flies over the courthouse.” (footnote
omitted)). Interesting constitutional questions about the relevance of contacts with
the forum state arise when nationwide service is available for state law claims in
federal court. See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 50 n.203 (discussing potential Erie issues in
diversity cases when the federal service rules have a longer reach than otherwise
applicable state service rules); Jackie Gardina, The Bankruptcy of Due Process: Nationwide
Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Code, 16 Am. Bankr. Inst. L.
Rev. 37 (2008) (discussing adjudication of state law claims in federal bankruptcy
courts).
44
See supra notes 41–42.
45
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574)
(“[T]he only reason that . . . the personal jurisdiction question, as applied in this
case, is a constitutional one is because Congress hasn’t provided for nationwide
service of process for Bivens claims.”).
46
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574). Walden
subsequently obtained private counsel after losing in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 9.
The record is apparently silent about why he obtained new counsel and whether the
United States paid all his legal expenses, although the United States paid for his
representation in the Supreme Court. See Klerman, supra note 26, at 722 n.38.
47
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (allowing court to grant protective order
specifying “place” for discovery); Farquhar v. Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (noting presumption in favor of deposing non-resident defendants in their
home states); O’Sullivan v. Rivera, 229 F.R.D. 187, 189 (D.N.M. 2004) (holding that
even though a Colorado resident “subjected himself to personal jurisdiction in New
Mexico,” the plaintiff must depose him in Colorado).
48
Even if Walden participated, he may have been able to appear “telephonically
or by video conference.” Wilcox v. Career Step, L.L.C., No. 2:08-CV-998 CW, 2010 WL
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50

best low, if not infinitesimal. Indeed, Walden might not have noticed
51
any significant difference between litigation in Nevada and Georgia.
Upholding personal jurisdiction in Nevada therefore was unlikely to
52
impose an undue burden, especially in proportion to the correlative
53
burden of requiring plaintiffs to litigate in Georgia.

4968263, at *4 (D. Utah Dec. 1, 2010) (rejecting challenge to personal jurisdiction in
part because technology facilitated appearances by nonresident defendants); Talent
Tree, Inc. v. Madlock, No. 4:07-cv-03735, 2008 WL 8082752, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8,
2008) (exercising personal jurisdiction and noting that “given modern
communications, many interactions with the Court, including hearings, can be
conducted electronically or by telephone”).
49
Identifying the percentage of Bivens actions that reach trial is difficult because
of how the Administrative Office of the United States Courts codes data. See
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for
the Individual Liability Model, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 833 & n.131 (2010) (noting that
several broad case categories encompass Bivens claims). However, the trial rate
appears to be very low. In 2008—the year that plaintiffs sued Walden—the national
trial rate for “other civil rights” actions against the United States was 1.4%. Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, 2008 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial
Business of the United States Courts 167 tbl.C-4 (2008) (showing data from the
year ending September 30, 2008). That is similar to the 1.2% trial rate in 2008 for the
District of Nevada’s entire civil docket. See id. at 173 tbl.C-4A.
50
Walden was a strong candidate for pretrial settlement given that the United
States Attorney’s office in Georgia apparently concluded that the challenged
probable cause affidavit did not justify forfeiture. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119–20; cf.
Reinert, supra note 49, at 846 & n.167 (noting that the United States generally pays
settlements negotiated on behalf of Bivens defendants).
51
Perhaps Walden would have preferred to meet with his lawyers in person
rather than via telephone or video conferencing. But that concern does not warrant a
constitutional remedy. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119
F.3d 935, 947 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is only in highly unusual cases that
inconvenience will rise to a level of constitutional concern [in nationwide service
cases].”); Klein v. Eaton, No. 2:13-cv-00440, 2014 WL 1922723, at *3 (D. Utah May 14,
2014) (upholding personal jurisdiction over nonresident and observing that “[a]ny
burden of litigating this matter in Utah is significantly lessened by technology that
allows [the defendant] to communicate remotely with counsel and to travel between
Texas and Utah”).
52
See Arocho v. Nafziger, 367 F. App’x 942, 951 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding
personal jurisdiction in Colorado Bivens action against federal officer in Washington,
D.C., who “can count on the resources and legal staff of the United States Attorney
for Colorado to defend his interests”). But see Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353
(2006) (noting that qualified immunity in Bivens actions protects officers from the
“burden of trial”); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 545 (1980) (expressing concern
about “the burden of defending personal damages actions” under Bivens).
53
Unlike Walden, plaintiffs lacked the benefit of representation by the
Department of Justice. The plaintiffs also contended that requiring them to travel
could create disturbing incentives for potential defendants. They speculated that law
enforcement officers may feel “embolden[ed]” to seize property from travelers
because the agents know that owners would encounter difficulty returning to the situs
of the seizure to oppose forfeiture. Brief for the Respondents at 48, Walden, 134 S. Ct.
1115 (No. 12-574) (noting that when local officers such as Walden seize currency,
some of the revenue might be used to fund their local police departments).
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In the unlikely event that litigating in Nevada would have been
burdensome, statutory remedies were available to protect Walden. First,
54
he could have challenged venue. Walden actually did challenge venue
in Nevada, but dismissal on personal jurisdiction grounds mooted his
55
venue arguments. A successful venue challenge would have resolved
56
Walden’s fairness concerns. Second, if the federal court in Nevada had
doubts about whether venue was reasonable, it could have transferred
57
the case to a federal court in Georgia. Transfer would have resolved
58
fairness concerns without resort to constitutional law.
In sum, Congress could have forced Walden to litigate in Nevada
despite his lack of contacts with Nevada. If Congress had authorized
nationwide service, the constitutional objections endorsed in Walden
would have been irrelevant.
III. CONGRESS’S POWER TO AUTHORIZE PERSONAL
JURISDICTION EVEN WHEN THE DEFENDANT LACKS CONTACTS
WITH THE FORUM STATE UNDERMINES SEVERAL PILLARS OF
MODERN PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
The foregoing discussion may seem academic because Congress did
not authorize nationwide service in Bivens actions. The Supreme Court’s
focus on Walden’s contacts with Nevada was therefore appropriate under
current doctrine. Moreover, I am not contending that nationwide service
54

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012) (listing venue requirements).
See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 n.5. The Ninth Circuit had upheld venue in
Nevada. See Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 587–88 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct.
1115 (2014). Justice Scalia apparently contemplated ruling for Walden on venue
grounds without considering personal jurisdiction. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 5, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574) (“Of course, the venue question . . . does
not bring into the Court a constitutional question and the . . . the jurisdictional one
does. . . . And we usually try to avoid constitutional questions.”).
56
Courts may address challenges to venue before addressing challenges to
personal jurisdiction. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
422, 432 (2007).
57
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”). Venue would have been
proper in the Northern District of Georgia because a “substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in Atlanta. Id. § 1391(b)(2).
58
See, e.g., Mountain Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, 9 F. Supp. 3d
895, 898 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (transferring case to a “more convenient forum” and
thereby mooting a pending challenge to personal jurisdiction). The district court in
Walden asked the parties if they wished to request a transfer, but they apparently
declined. See Fiore v. Walden, No. 2:07-CV-01674-ECR, 2008 WL 9833854, at *4 (D.
Nev. Oct. 17, 2008) (“[T]he parties here agree that such a transfer would not be in
the interests of justice.”), rev’d, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1115
(2014). The district court focused on transferring the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1631
due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. It is not clear whether the district court
also considered transferring the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) before addressing
personal jurisdiction.
55
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59

is desirable in Bivens actions or in general. Instead, my argument
focuses on how Congress’s ability to authorize personal jurisdiction
requires reconsidering doctrine that applies when Congress has not
acted.
The fact that Congress could have altered the result in Walden
suggests that the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is
fundamentally misguided. The argument proceeds in three steps. First,
the question of whether venue within the state’s borders would be
burdensome is analytically distinct from the question of which
governments can compel a defendant to appear within those borders.
Second, the concept of “liberty” is not helpful when trying to determine
which governments can compel a defendant’s appearance. Finally, when
Congress has not authorized nationwide service, personal jurisdiction
60
should be understood as a horizontal federalism problem.
A. Disentangling the Physical and Legal Dimensions of States and
Distinguishing Constitutional Limits on Venue from Constitutional Limits on
Jurisdiction
“States” exist in two distinct forms: as physical places and as
61
government entities. When assessing constitutional limits on personal
jurisdiction, courts must consider two different issues: whether litigation
is appropriate within the state’s physical borders; and whether the state
may compel the defendant to appear and penalize him for not
appearing. Distinguishing these issues isolates two key questions: (1)
where is litigation appropriate; and (2) which governments may exercise
jurisdiction?
Asking the “where” question in Walden reveals that adjudication in
Nevada did not raise constitutional concerns relevant to personal
jurisdiction. Litigation in Nevada would have been equally burdensome
whether Congress authorized nationwide service or borrowed Nevada’s
long-arm statute. Likewise, the plaintiffs’ interest in litigating in Nevada
would have been equally strong, as would the relevant government’s
62
interest in providing a forum in Nevada. Accordingly, if the defendant’s
59
I have previously observed that nationwide service might not be optimal in
many diversity cases; whether it is appropriate in particular federal question cases is
beyond the scope of this Article. See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 83 n.323. For recent
proposals to expand nationwide service in federal court, see Klerman, supra note 26;
Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301
(2014); A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87
Denv. U. L. Rev. 325 (2010).
60
A more detailed account of the underlying theory is available in my prior work.
See Erbsen, supra note 8.
61
For analysis of how geography and government power intersect in the federal
system, see Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1168 (2011).
62
Nevada’s long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction to the maximum extent that
the Constitution allows. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 14.065(1) (2013). Thus, whether
Congress authorized nationwide service or borrowed Nevada’s long-arm statute, the
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interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation in Nevada could not have
raised a constitutional obstacle to personal jurisdiction in a nationwide
service case, it could not have raised a constitutional obstacle in either
the actual Walden case or an identical hypothetical case filed in a Nevada
63
state court under the same long-arm statute.
The apparent absence of a remedy for burdensome assertions of
forum power may seem troubling, but there is an easy solution: the Court
should constitutionalize venue doctrine, such that neither Congress nor
64
The
the states may authorize unduly burdensome litigation.
Constitution would generate two distinct doctrines addressing two
distinct inquiries: venue doctrine would assess whether litigation in a
particular physical location is appropriate while personal jurisdiction
doctrine would consider whether a particular government can compel
the defendant to appear.
Given that the constitutional concern animating Walden could not
have arisen from the “where” question, it must have arisen from the
“which governments” question. In other words, the problem was that the
defendant was haled into court under the authority of a government that
could not compel his appearance. In Walden, the relevant government
entity was Nevada because Congress chose to make federal authority
65
coextensive with Nevada’s authority. If Congress had authorized
nationwide service, the relevant government would have been the United
66
States and jurisdiction would have been proper. The next two sections
consider how courts should approach the “which governments” question.
B. Decoupling Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine from Concerns About Liberty
If jurisdiction hinges on the identity of the government actor
asserting power, then liberty should not be the central issue. Outside the
personal jurisdiction context, the Court often invokes individual liberty

relevant government would have been attempting to extend its reach as far as
possible.
63
The Court often interchangeably cites precedents involving personal
jurisdiction in state and federal court when the federal court relied on the state’s
long-arm statute. For example, Walden was a case about jurisdiction in federal court,
but it extensively cited an analogous precedent about jurisdiction in state court
without noting the federal/state distinction. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–24
(discussing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
64
See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 18–32 (discussing constitutional limits on venue);
Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1153
(2014).
65
See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 51–52 & n.212 (considering how “due process”
applies in federal court when federal law incorporates limits on state authority). A
constitutional rule might limit even intrastate venue, preventing large states from
compelling a defendant to appear in a distant outlying area. See id. at 29–31 (“The
current rule making burdens relevant when the issue is ‘jurisdiction’ but not when
the issue is ‘venue’ is a pointless jurisprudence of labels.”).
66
See supra Part II.
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in the sense of a protected zone of conduct, where the emphasis is on
shielding the actor from government interference with his or her
67
behavior. This aspect of liberty would be relevant to personal
jurisdiction if the fear of jurisdictional consequences chilled
constitutionally protected activity. Yet the Court has declined an
opportunity to consider this aspect of liberty in a personal jurisdiction
68
case. Liberty may also be relevant in the sense that it protects people
from being wrongfully seized by the government, which is what service of
69
process symbolically achieves. Yet that conception of liberty could not
have animated Walden because the liberty interest in avoiding a civil
summons does not create a right to avoid being sued anywhere, but merely
a right to avoid being sued in the wrong forum. Nobody argued in Walden
that the defendant could not be served with process. The only issue was
whether process needed to emanate from Georgia rather than Nevada.
My argument does not rely on formal labels, but the word
“immunity” may be more helpful than liberty for describing the dynamics
of personal jurisdiction when defendants are domiciled outside the
70
forum. Essentially, defendants have a limited immunity from suit that
71
the forum can abrogate, depending on the defendant’s actions,

67

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have not generated a single
comprehensive account of individual liberty interests because “the Court has not
assumed to define ‘liberty’ with any great precision.” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954). I therefore do not doubt that framing personal jurisdiction in terms of
liberty might be theoretically coherent for some purposes, but instead contend that
references to liberty in personal jurisdiction cases are often unhelpful.
68
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“We also reject the suggestion
that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis. The infusion of
such considerations would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry.”).
69
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto
power over the defendant’s person.”); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 712
(N.Y. 1965) (“[Personal jurisdiction] is an imposition of sovereign power over the
person. It is usually exerted by symbolic and rarely by actual force, e.g., the summons
as a symbol of force; the attachment and the civil arrest, as exerting actual force.”);
Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine,
78 Yale L.J. 52, 58–80 (1968) (tracing history of service mechanisms that were to
varying degrees symbolic and coercive).
70
Defendants domiciled within the forum are subject to general jurisdiction and
thus have no immunity from suit. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an
individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”).
71
Cf. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
Harv. L. Rev. 1559 (2002) (exploring doctrine that blurs concepts of immunity and
personal jurisdiction). I do not intend this informal word choice to imply that
personal jurisdiction doctrine is rooted in an “Immunities” Clause of the
Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1
(“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
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72

government interests, and competing private interests. In contrast, a
“liberty” interest that Congress can override merely by deciding to
authorize nationwide service seems hollow. This hollowness is the core of
modern doctrine.
For example, Justice Kennedy recently explained in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro that personal jurisdiction offends “liberty” when
73
the forum does not exercise “lawful” power. Whether power is lawful in
this framework depends on who exercises it: “a judicial judgment is
lawful” if “the sovereign has authority to render it,” which requires
74
analysis “sovereign-by-sovereign.” Thus, Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion acknowledged that a federal court might be able to exercise
75
personal jurisdiction when a colocated state court could not, and that
allowing the wrong state to exercise jurisdiction “would upset the federal
balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject
76
to unlawful intrusion by other States.” Despite these concessions, the
Nicastro plurality embraced the Court’s prior decision in Insurance Corp. of
77
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, denying that federalism
78
concerns animate personal jurisdiction doctrine. The plurality therefore
intermingled its references to federalism with a rights-centered vision of
liberty, stating that “it is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes
jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

immunities of citizens of the United States.”); see also Erbsen, supra note 8, at 86 n.331
(discussing Article IV).
72
For a discussion of interest balancing in a portion of the Court’s Asahi opinion
that garnered eight votes, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
114 (1987) (“When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of
the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious
burdens placed on the alien defendant.”).
73
131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy’s opinion
mustered three additional votes (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas). A separate concurrence by Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Alito)
sidestepped most of the plurality’s constitutional analysis in favor of a narrow
holding. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“There may well have
been other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of
jurisdiction. . . . But the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, and
here I would take the facts precisely as the New Jersey Supreme Court stated them.”).
74
Id. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
75
See id. (“[A] defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”).
76
Id. For an analysis of Nicastro that situates the plurality opinion in the context
of Justice Kennedy’s broader jurisprudence about sovereignty, see John T. Parry,
Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J.
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 827, 860–63 (2012).
77
456 U.S. 694 (1982).
78
See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“Personal jurisdiction, of
course, restricts ‘judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty’ . . . .” (quoting Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702)).
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justice.” Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro also clung to Bauxites,
even though a federalism theory might have strengthened the dissent’s
81
argument. The Justices’ decision to invoke liberty cloaks a federalism
82
problem with the distracting rhetoric of individual rights.
A high-minded emphasis on liberty can cause courts to lose sight of
reality. The Nicastro plurality ended its opinion by observing that “the
Constitution commands restraint before discarding liberty in the name of
83
expediency.” That gilded rhetoric seems comforting until one focuses
on the supposed “expediency”: a New Jersey court exercising jurisdiction
over the manufacturer of a machine that severed four of the plaintiff’s
84
fingers in New Jersey. The manufacturer had helped market its scrap
85
metal shearing machine to buyers throughout the United States, and

79

Id. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice
Kennedy suggested in an analogous case that he is more willing to accept the
existence of state power over a nonresident when local contacts implicate important
state interests. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“There is a powerful case to be made that a retailer doing extensive
business within a State” should be subject to taxation by that state “even if that
business is done through mail or the Internet.”).
80
See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“[C]onstitutional
limits on a state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due
process, not state sovereignty.” (citing Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 703)).
81
See infra text accompanying notes 84–87. The plurality and dissenting opinions
may not mean exactly what they appear to say. Each opinion offers an explicit
account of what it is trying to accomplish, but the tone and emphasis suggest
additional commitments. Thus, as Wendy Collins Perdue observed: “In the topsy-turvy
world of personal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy can assert that he is mostly concerned
about sovereignty but adopt an approach to jurisdiction that seems far more
grounded in a particular vision of individual liberty. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg can
profess that her primary concern is to protect due process rights of individuals, but in
fact focus on what powers it is reasonable for a state to have to address injuries
occurring within its borders.” Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with
It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 729, 743
(2012). I focus on the methodological approach that the Justices claimed to adopt,
which most lower courts presumably will attempt to apply.
82
For additional analysis of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, see Allan Ides, Foreword:
A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 45 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 341, 358–70 (2012); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the
Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L.
Rev. 481, 491–504 (2012); Allan Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction, McIntyre v. Nicastro, and
Horizontal Federalism, PrawfsBlawg (Aug. 17, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2011/08/personal-jurisdiction-mcintyre-v-nicastro-and-horizontalfederalism.html. Most academic commentary about Nicastro has been critical to
varying degrees. But see David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 Stan. J. Complex
Litig. 41, 78 (2014) (contending that Nicastro’s holding is a “powerful, if indirect”
means of limiting state authority to regulate product design in a national market).
83
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion).
84
See id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85
See id. at 2795–96.
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86

New Jersey was one of its largest potential markets. From a federalism
perspective, it is difficult to see the problem with allowing New Jersey’s
87
courts to adjudicate the suit.
The Court’s unanimous opinion in Walden does not repeat the
statements about liberty that appeared in the Nicastro plurality opinion
three years earlier. Indeed, Walden does not cite Nicastro even though
Walden’s author (Justice Thomas) was part of the Nicastro plurality.
Walden simply invoked “liberty” without explaining why it mattered given
that Congress could easily have authorized jurisdiction notwithstanding
88
the asserted liberty interest. The lean references to “liberty” in Walden
compared to the extensive discussion in Nicastro suggests that the Walden
Court consciously avoided elaboration, perhaps due to the absence of a
fifth vote for Justice Kennedy’s theories. In any event, Walden indicates
that the Court has no discernable theory of liberty in personal
jurisdiction cases.
Walden relies on liberty without acknowledging that the precedent
on which it grounds that reliance did not invoke liberty. Walden’s two
89
references to “liberty” both cite World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.
But the word “liberty” does not appear anywhere in Volkswagen. Instead,
the cited pages of Volkswagen stated that:
The concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not

86

See id. at 2801 (“How could [the defendant] not have intended, by its actions
targeting a national market, to sell products in the fourth largest destination for
imports among all States of the United States and the largest scrap metal market?”);
John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Decisions in Goodyear Dunlap Tires and Nicastro, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1707, 1732
(2013) (criticizing the plurality’s distinction between serving the entire United States
market and targeting its individual state components).
87
See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“New Jersey’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product
caused a workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish
the sovereignty, of any sister State. Indeed, among States of the United States, the
State in which the injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a
products liability tort claim.”). The defendant was a foreign rather than domestic
corporation, which in some circumstances can complicate analysis of jurisdiction. See
Erbsen, supra note 8, at 35–36. However, the plurality did not indicate that the
holding might have changed if the defendant had been based in the United States
(but outside New Jersey).
88
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative
authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant . . . .” (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980))); id. at 1125
n.9 (“[W]e reiterate that the ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry principally protects the
liberty of the nonresident defendant . . . .” (quoting Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92)).
89
444 U.S. 286 (1980). See supra note 88.
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reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.90

Volkswagen’s reference to burdens relates to the “where” question
discussed above, while the reference to “coequal sovereigns” relates to
the “which governments” question. Neither reference supports Walden’s
broad concept of “liberty.”
The erratic treatment of liberty and federalism in the Court’s
personal jurisdiction decisions is disconcerting. Here is the relatively
recent sequence:
-In Volkswagen, the Court invoked federalism and never
mentioned liberty.
-In Bauxites, the Court relied on liberty and retreated from the
91
federalism reference in Volkswagen.
-In Nicastro, the plurality endorsed Bauxites’ reference to liberty
while also reviving the federalism angle of Volkswagen.
-In Walden, the Court relied on liberty rather than federalism
but attributed the liberty rationale to Volkswagen.
The Court either does not realize or refuses to acknowledge the
92
extent of its vacillations; either way, the consequences are troubling.
The problem is that the Court is trying to squeeze a “which governments”
federalism question into the framework of individual rights, where it does
93
not fit comfortably and creates confusion.
Reorienting personal jurisdiction doctrine to emphasize horizontal
federalism would not eliminate consideration of the defendant’s
interests. First, a newly constitutionalized venue doctrine would account
94
for individual rights. Second, horizontal federalism doctrines consider

90

Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92.
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”). The Court in Bauxites retreated
from Volkswagen’s reference to federalism. See id. at 702 n.10 (“The restriction on state
sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and
the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”).
92
These vacillations extend farther back than Volkswagen. See Perdue, supra note
81, at 734–39 (discussing evolution of the Court’s references to liberty, sovereignty,
and federalism).
93
For a more theoretical analysis of why liberty is an inadequate guiding
principle for personal jurisdiction doctrine, see Erbsen, supra note 8, at 54–60; id. at
66 (“To say that a given exercise of personal jurisdiction is unconstitutional is . . . to
say that a state has usurped authority that belongs elsewhere. And to say that this
usurpation offends a ‘right’ or infringes upon ‘liberty’ or violates ‘due process’ simply
begs the question of what values animate the constitutional inquiry into where
jurisdiction belongs.”).
94
See supra Part III(A).
91
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individual interests as a part of a broader calculus of competing public
95
and private interests. Emphasizing federalism places the state at the
“center” of the inquiry, but still requires developing an “analytic
approach” that accounts for all relevant factors, including individual
96
interests. My suggested framework for reforming personal jurisdiction
doctrine therefore avoids the concern that federalism-oriented theories
may be unattractive because they “neglect[] to provide any account of
97
the individual interests at stake.” The challenge for courts is to identify
individual interests that matter in the context of allocating regulatory
power in a federal system, rather than interests that resonate with a
98
vaguely defined sense of liberty.
C. Reframing Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in Terms of Horizontal Federalism
Sections A and B established that constitutional challenges to
personal jurisdiction raise questions about the allocation of jurisdictional
authority in a federal system. This Section briefly notes three potential
benefits of reframing personal jurisdiction as a horizontal federalism
problem.
First, a horizontal federalism perspective facilitates grounding
personal jurisdiction doctrine in the Constitution’s text. Part of the
reason that modern personal jurisdiction doctrine is so unstable is that it
99
draws authority “only” from the Due Process Clause. Yet that clause
provides very little guidance. For example, the district court in Walden
provided the defendant adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, an
impartial adjudicator, and a statutory safety valve that would have allowed
100
transfer to a more convenient forum. The Due Process Clause does not
101
explicitly suggest that more is required, but Walden demanded more.
95

See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 547–50, 564–66
(2008).
96
Perdue, supra note 81, at 739.
97
Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction:
Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v.
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 617, 624 (2012).
98
See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 748 (1987) (considering implications of
reframing a rights-oriented theory of “purposeful availment” as a federalism-oriented
theory of “predictability”).
99
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10
(1982) (stating that the Due Process Clause “is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement”).
100
See supra note 57–58.
101
Cf. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–63 (1940) (upholding personal
jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled in the forum and observing that “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process” require “notice”
and “an opportunity to be heard” (citation omitted)). For an argument defending
the prominent role of “due process” in personal jurisdiction doctrine, see Charles W.
“Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tul. L.
Rev. 567 (2007).
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Operating without textual guidance, the Court has constructed an array
of oft-criticized standards, such as “purposeful availment,” “reasonably
102
anticipate,” and “minimum contacts.” In contrast, numerous provisions
103
of the Constitution govern horizontal federalism. These texts may not
be a model of clarity, but collectively can provide additional guidance
about the allocation of jurisdiction among states with overlapping
authority. Rebuilding personal jurisdiction doctrine on the foundation of
these additional texts would provide an opportunity to sweep aside the
oft-criticized atextual jargon that currently animates judicial decisions.
Second, building from the prior point, if multiple texts can provide
more precise guidance, so too can the many doctrines emerging from
those texts. Courts might profitably analogize personal jurisdiction issues
to choice of law, enforcement of judgments, extraterritorial legislation,
104
and dormant federal preemption of state authority. Such an approach
could have changed the outcome in Nicastro given New Jersey’s strong
regulatory interests, but might have reached the same result in Walden
given Nevada’s tenuous connection to the underlying conduct relative to
105
Georgia.
Finally, treating personal jurisdiction as a federalism problem
suggests that federal statutory remedies may obviate judicially created
remedies that rely on the Fourteenth Amendment (although
constitutional remedies for improper venue would still be available). The
premise of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine is that adjudication can
violate individual liberty interests, requiring a judicial remedy (dismissal)
102

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985)(citations
omitted).
103
See Erbsen, supra note 95, at 529–60 (categorizing the Constitution’s methods
for regulating horizontal federalism).
104
See id. at 560–72 (identifying patterns in the Court’s jurisprudence governing
horizontal federalism); Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of
Horizontal Federalism, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 57, 78 (2014) (noting that personal
jurisdiction doctrine implicates “horizontal federalism” when it leads to the
“underenforcement” of state law); Geoffrey P. Miller, In Search of the Most Adequate
Forum: State Court Personal Jurisdiction, 2 Stan. J. Complex Litig. 1, 24 (2014)
(suggesting that incorporating “horizontal federalism” principles into personal
jurisdiction analysis can help identify “the tribunal that can resolve the controversy at
the lowest social cost”); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98
Iowa L. Rev. 1163, 1206 (2013) (“[F]ocus[ing] on choice of law explains the
importance of state lines [in personal jurisdiction doctrine].”).
105
See supra text accompanying notes 84–86. Eighteen states and the District of
Columbia filed an amicus brief in Walden contending that their “interest in
vindicating the injuries of their own residents, as plaintiffs, in their own courts” was
“outweighed by their interest in protecting their residents from being haled, unfairly,
into other States’ courts as defendants.” Brief of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 1, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (No. 12-574); see
also id. at 2 (“It would be very easy for a State to maintain, in a particular case in
which one of its residents has been harmed, that it wants its own courts to resolve
these kinds of disputes. But . . . their residents are better off if personal jurisdiction is
not based solely on the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s home State.”).
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that forces the plaintiff to refile in another forum or abandon the suit.
But if the real problem is not where adjudication occurs but rather which
government compels the defendant’s appearance, then Congress can
provide a remedy by authorizing nationwide service and removal to
federal court. Even if removal and/or nationwide service are not
available in a particular case, the fact that Congress could have provided
a statutory remedy but chose not to may be sufficient to preclude
judicially created remedies that rely on the Fourteenth Amendment
(although constitutional remedies for improper venue would still be
available. If considering the “which governments” aspect of personal
jurisdiction leads to an emphasis on statutory remedies rather than the
judicially created “minimum contacts” test, then the entire body of
precedent underlying Walden would become defunct. This theory of
106
course has limits, which I have addressed in prior work.
Jettisoning decades of precedent would be unsettling, but may be
faithful to the original Constitution’s design. The constitutional provision
creating current judicial remedies for aggrieved state court defendants is
107
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This clause did not
exist when the Constitution was adopted. In contrast, the Constitution
has always authorized Congress to federalize certain cases that would
108
otherwise have been heard in state courts, including cases where local
109
residents sue outsiders. Common law rules were also available to
prevent enforcement of judgments rendered without jurisdiction under
110
the territorial view of state power in vogue at the time. If this regime
was sufficient to protect outsiders from overreaching states until 1868, it
may remain sufficient, although more historical research and normative
111
analysis would be necessary before reaching a definitive conclusion. In
any event, my argument here does not depend on abandoning judicially

106

See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 35–36, 79. A role for constitutional remedies might
remain in transnational cases and unusual situations where statutory remedies would
be inadequate. See id.
107
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
108
See id. art. III, § 2.
109
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (“Article III
poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on
diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”).
110
Compare Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367 (1873) (opinion by Justice
Field articulating a territorial theory of jurisdiction without reference to the
Fourteenth Amendment), with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (opinion by
Justice Field that essentially repeats Galpin’s analysis while resting the holding on the
Due Process Clause); see also John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal
Jurisdiction, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1015, 1020–24 (1983) (discussing jurisprudence before
1868); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169 (2004) (same).
111
See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 75–88 (discussing the relevant history in more
detail and suggesting a need for further scholarship about how the original
Constitution’s mechanisms for addressing personal jurisdiction should influence
modern doctrine grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment).
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created remedies that invoke the Constitution. For present purposes, the
possibility that statutory and common law remedies might be adequate
requires a more precise account of why judicially enforceable
constitutional remedies are necessary. Current doctrine blurring venue
and jurisdiction into a single “liberty” inquiry does not provide a
sufficient justification for judicial intervention when venue is proper and
only jurisdiction is at issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unanimous opinion in Walden is an imposing edifice
constructed on sand. The result and reasoning seem sturdy until one asks
unsettling questions. Considering how a nationwide service statute would
have changed the result reveals that the jurisdictional defect hinged on
congressional inaction rather than an intrinsic constitutional obstacle to
litigation in Nevada. Taking that observation to its logical conclusion
suggests that the Court must overhaul personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Analysis of venue and personal jurisdiction should entail distinct
constitutional inquiries, and the inquiry into personal jurisdiction should
focus on state regulatory authority in a federal system rather than
individual liberty. There is even a plausible argument that judicially
created remedies are unnecessary when federal statutory remedies are
potentially available.

